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THE BAROMETER is a student bi-weekly newspaper for the exchange of 
ideas and information concerning the development and improvement of 
the professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. Items 
of interest, papers, and articles of interest to the students, staff, 
and faculty as a whole are solicited. 
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"People are our most important asset, and the key to our 
readiness posture. Their proper utilization through intelligent 
use of shipboard automation, sytems integration and good design 
which eliminate unnecessary tasks and equipments is our greatest 
challenge in today's Navy under the AVF. We must keep this 
challenge foremost in our minds as we attack the proble~ of ~r 
today and design the ships of tomorrow." Vice Admiral waEfer~ 9 ::3 
Gaddis, USN Deputy Chief of Naval Operations c: ~ ~ ( I) ' i ..... 
"-/ ~ l ' •• _ 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: The feature article for this week comes from the J~~l~ issue of 
the Naval Engineers Journal. It is the luncheon address delivered by 8tee ~r~~ Walter 
D. Gaddis, USN who is Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics). ~~ ~ 1- '_ 
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FEATURE: PEOPLE - OUR MOST IMPORTANT AS SET. m r 
"People are our most important asset. People are the key with which we energize this 
great machine called the United States Navy. Without them, ships cannot sail; aircraft 
cannot fly. And today, with higher costs for everything, and an All Volunteer Force, 
the proper utilization of our precious manpower is 'more important than ever before. 
I would like to discuss with you some of the aspects of this problem that we are 
striving to improve, and to point out some ways in which you gentlemen", can help. 
We are well along in the shift from a wartime to a peacetime Navy. The single most 
significant aspect of this process is the conversion of the Navy to an All Volunteer 
Force (AVF). Throughout the rest of our discussion I would ask you to focus your attention 
on the AVF and the impact it will have upon the supply of skilled personnel to man the 
Navy in the future. 
No longer can we afford a personnel manpower system which is driven by a machine-
centered demand to fill more and more billets calling for highly specialized skills. 
There must be a fundamental change in the system's philosophy that recognizes the supply 
of skilled people will be limited. For the past three years, the Navy has been required 
to make significant reductions in the levels of total manpower in order to meet limits 
imposed by the Congress and the Department of Defense. A couple of little known statistics 
might emphasize the point. 
FIRST, a base force of 500,000 has been selected for planning purposes because that 
is the force level set forth by law (10 U.S. Code 5401) as the maximum force in a non-
emergency environment. 
SECOND, projections developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in July 1973 predict 
a decline of approximately 2.2 million males and 2.15 females in the 18 to 24 age group 
during the 1980's.-You younger gentlemen might be interested in trying to buck that trend, 
but ~eriously, if this downward trend is realized, and continues past the year 1990, 
it could pose a serious challenge to the success of any Volunteer Force in the long term. 
The Navy is already over-extended in its ~pecification of skill requirements to operate 
and maintain weapons and their support systems. It is unrelaistic to think that this trend 
can continue much longer, regardless of the quality of the manpower pool, without inviting 
a serious breakdown of the personnel/manpower system. Under the best possible conditions, 
there is the imminent danger that there soOq will be more specialized billets than there are 
trainable people to fill them. 
-2-
In assessing the impact of the AVF on the Navy, the composition of the Navy for the 
past ten years has been examined and a five year projection was made. The mental level, 
educational background and age of our sailors do not depart radically from past and present 
levels. However, levels of ability to read and comprehend have declined, and are expected 
to decline further, continuing a downward trend since 1964. 
These projections should significantly influence and constrain the basic philosophies 
of weapon system performance and design as well as the management of enlisted manpower. 
The trend toward sophisitcation of weapon systems and components must be counter-balanced 
by a comparable easing of required skills for maintenance and repair. By a dedicated 
program to increase the mean time between maintenance actions that is required on equipments 
and by simplifying maintenance procedures, the man-hours and number of personnel required 
to maintain these equipments can be reduced, and personnel of lower mental accuity utilized. 
Further utilization of these resources can be realized by increasing the mean time between 
failure of equipments and facilitating the isolation and identification of each fail ure by 
such innovations as 'buil t-in' self-diagnostic capabilities and modular replacement. 
Relatively few of the plans for development and introduction of systems now being insta-
lled in the fleet adequately address the skill requirements for operations, maintenance and 
particularly repair. However, plans recently formulated indicate that the following trendb ~ 
may be starting: 
FIRST, throughout our Naval Material Command, requirements are now being levied that 
systmes be designed for easier maintenance, diagnosis and repair. Mean time between fail-
ure is to be increase and use of fault-locacting circuits, 'built-in' test equipment and 
modular replacement is to be maximized. If these innovations become reality-and they must-
a less demanding level of skill may be employed to operate and service the systems, with 
training costs reduced accordingly. 
SECOND, whil e individual components of a system are being designed for easier serviceability, 
there i s a trend toward interfacing them into centralized and computerized control s ystems. 
A r el a t ively f ew highly skilled Systems Technicians, who understand both the operation of 
all components and their interrelationships, will be required to operate the system and 
oversee the work of technicians who will be responsible for its components. Casualties 
will be isoled by these system technicians, and the component technicians will conduct 
further diagnosis and effect repairs. These System Technicians will require a higher level 
of training than do t echnicians who presently operate, maintain and repair equipments. 
However, the number of billets requiring these highly skilled technicians should be signif-
icantly l ess t han t hose billets the presently require senior technicians. 
In some technological areas, most notably the gas turbine propulsion system and the DLG 
combat systems, the r equirement for this type of systems trained technician is definitely 
emerging. Compared to the current engineering ratings, the gas turbine requirements encomp-
ass more knowledge areas than does any single rating. The combat systems technician is 
developing because of a maintenance requirement that must be met over a broad spectrum of 
sub-components. The DLG( N) 38 and DD 963 Class ships are equipped with a central computer 
complex which controls the operations of the individual ship's sensors, fire control sub-
systems, and weapon launching equipment. To operate and maintain this system properly, 
senior personnel must be trained in the theory, operation and maintenance of the entire 
combat system and not jus t the sub-systems peculiar to their own rating. This combat 
system technician would be trained from the most able personnel in the ratings whose 
equipment is associated with, or controlled by, the central computer. 
Development of the SSN 688 and TRIDENT Class submarines also has resulted in a require-
ment for a systems technician akin to the combat system technician on surface ships. The 
limitations on the size of the ship. however, constrain the number of maintenance oriented 
billets. The result is a requirement for an even larger proportion of highly skilled 
technicians to sub-system component ratings than is the case in surface ships. In each of 
the ships cited the number of systems technicians must be minimized if we are to maintain 
them with the manpower available. 
THIRD, equipment design techniques must be controlled, and a concerted effort made to 
revise technical publications for eariser use and more thorough comprehension. New systems 
and equipments must be designed to facilitate maintenance and repair by the average blue-
jacket. This principle has been clearly enunciated and is being implemented by our Chief 
of Naval Material. The watchword to the technical manual writers is: 'TAKE TIME TO MAKE 
IT SIMPLE.' 
Additionally, study of the Navy Enlisted Occupational Classificat ion System has 
recently been completed. The Study Group's plan for redesigning the enlisted occupational 
classification system is attuned to the reality that there are limitations to the current 
and future supply of talented people to man the Navy. 
The plan's philosophy recognizes the changing quality of the men and women expected 
to pursue naval careers in an All Volunteer Force, and relates the supply to t he projected 
future demands of weapons· technol ogy f or skills. The NEOCS Plan assumes tha t these f uture 
weapons systems will be designed so as to consider the oper a t or and mai ntainer and to 
integrate training and personnel management into each system. 
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Now, what about the ships in the Fleet today? Although the average age of the Fleet 
is decreasing-from almost 18 years in 1969 (926 ships) to 13.4 years (511 ships) this year-
we still have a large number of general purpose ships manned to perform all their functions 
simultaneously. And many of us still think in these terms-a ship should be able to carry 
Out simultaneously coordinated air, surface and ASW attacks while steaming at flank speed 
in a Task Group. 
Unfortunately, even in our older ships, this is no longer the case. Ship systems have 
been modernized and are no longer the simple, independent equipments they once were. As we 
learn more about our systems and equipments we impose more extensive operating and maintena-
nce requirements through modernization. These, and other factors have had a significant 
impact both on our current forces and those ships that we are designing and building. 
In an effort to keep abreast of modern technology as it increases the complexity and 
scope of naval warfare, as well as to improve the performance of older equipment, we have 
institute several maintenance and tracking programs either in addition to, or as adjuncts 
of, the Ships' Maintenance and Material Management System, case '3-M'. Performance tests 
have been devised for a number of equipments using vibration, sound, oil, and pressure 
~)nalyses to evaluate the condition of the equipment without having to resort to the more 
time-consuming 'open and inspect' methods. These methods save wear and tear on the equip-
ments, and, more importantly, save precious time for our maintenance and repair technicians. 
On the system level, we recognized that our '3-M System" did not provide the ship with the 
capability of verifying that performance of ship systems would enable the ship to carry 
out its assigned m~ssion. We developed a Total Ship Test Program concept as an adjunct to 
'3-M'. It divides the total spectrum of ship system tests into Combat, Combat Support, 
Mobility and Containment Systems with the goal of obtaining the most efficient use of our 
maintenance assets. 
About four years ago, the Naval Ship Systems Command was assigned the responsibility 
for evaluating Fleet equipment relaibility data and for developing a coordinated management 
progrm for improving Fleet support. If the Fleet's most serious equipment problems were 
continually changing from year to year, we could assume that problems were being corrected 
as they became known. However, NAVSHIPS found that the Fleet's most serious problem 
equipments have not basically changed for the past five or more years. Why then, have these 
problems not been corrected? Technicial complexity is, of course, one part of the answer; 
but this is only part. The other part of the answer includes changing priorities, lack of 
funds, disagreement as to just what is the problem, and most importantly, the lack of 
qualified goals for acceptable performance. For years and years, we have reacted to the 
'squeaky wheel' principle in an honest attempt to be responsibe to the Fleet's needs and 
complaints. 
The DART Program-Detection, Action and Response Technique- was established with the Naval 
Material Command for just that purpose of identidication and correction of the most serious 
shipboard equipment problems affecting the Fleet's material readiness. DART tracks the 16 
most serious material problems plaguing the Fleet today, picked from a list of nominees 
and ranked based on the Material Condition Index from the Consolidated CASREPT Reporting 
System, '3-M' data and SYSCOM and Fleet recommendations. 
DART has helped us identify and correct some of our most serious problems. But if it 
is to assist in the longer range solution, we must these data to determine why these 
equipments became material problems. We must answer the question: 'How could they have been 
designed and built to provide better reliability and easier maintainability with a realistic 
acknowledgement of the skill levels of the sailors who would be operating and maintaining 
them?' The problem is and has been serious, even with older, less complicated equipment, 
and with ship's manning that provides for maintenance. The answers we get will insure that 
much more reliability is in our future ships. 
Although we still have multi-purpose ships in the Fleet, our newer ships are designed to 
~~ulfill more specialized missions. Because of thiS, and as a result of automation and other 
new developments, we have been able to reduce singificantly the numbers of sailors required 
to man these new ships. 
It is no secret that manpower costs under the AVF are as important a factor as modern 
technology in their impact both on the modernization of our current forces and on new 
design. Even though the Navy is heavily materiel oriented, personel costs consume over 
half of our budget and are increasing every year. We have a very real interest, from a 
dollars and cents standpoint, in how well automation and other manpower-saving programs 
work while still maintaining the combat effectiveness of the Fleet. 
If we are to increase the effectiveness of our manpower, we must first understand the 
problem. It is within the state-of-the-art today to provide almost any degree of automation 
or system inegration. Too often, the engineer gets carried away with designing the most 
complex system possible, when a simpler solution would suffice. In this regard, I am remin-
ded of the many wonderful inventions of the late Rube Goldberg. As with his inventions, 
the complex approach leads to more problems than it solves. Complexity often breed un-
reliability, raises the skill requirements for both operator and maintainer to unrealistic 
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and unattainable levels, and requires more personnel to process the information gained and 
to keep the system working. In the immediate past, we have tended to 'complex ourselves 
out of business.' 
On the other hand, if, in designing a ship or weapons system, we consciously look for 
the most effective way to do the job under 'Design to Cost' rules and consider manpower 
appropriately in that cost, we can come up with equipments and systems which will adequately 
and effectively fulfill the mission with lesser requirements for both numbers and skill 
levels of personnel . 
The Patrol Frigate Program is a good example of the effort, in which reduction of 
personnel was used as primary factor in the design equation. In this ship state-of-the-art 
systmes have been chosen which are reliable, maintainable and require fewer people to 
operate. New maintenance concepts are being introduced, many based upon, or similar to, 
aircraft maintenance philosophies; such as modular replacement of components based upon 
performance or condition testing and analysis, automated test equipment, new materials, 
and others. 
There is much more that can and must be done in this area if we are truly going to 
provide a means to retain mission capability with reduced manning for both operations and 
maintenance. We need simple, reliable weapons and engineering systems; better materials 
and coatings to improve both reliability and maintainability; and more refinements in 
preventive maintenance procedures along the lines of those previously mentioned. We need 
a maintenance philosophy and firm maintenance strategy for these new ships that will 
provide means of failure prediction and a determination of optimum repair and overhaul 
frequencies. We need more information and data of the effectiveness and economies of shore 
based maintenance as opposed to 'on board' maintenance. Is it really a viable, economical 
philosophy? How much automation and integration is enough but not too much? Which systems 
and equipments must have a manual means of operation as a backup, and how much redundancy 
must we have in case of battle damage? 
These last two points in particular give me cause for concern. The old poem about the 
blacksmith--' .•• for want of a nail ••• '--becomes magnified many times in an automated, 
computerized ship that has no backup manual capability and no other means to fight except 
its automated systems. In our efforts to save manpower and money, we must not forfeit the 
capability of fighting the ship. Replacing log keepers and messengers, or navigating by 
satellite is one thing making the entire capability of a warship totally dependent on one 
vital part is quite another. 
People are our most important asset, and the key to our readiness posture. Their 
proper utilization through intelligent use of shipboard automation, systems integration 
and good design which eliminates unnecessary tasks and equipments is our greatest challenge 
in today's Navy under the AVF. We must keep this challenge foremost in our minds as we 
attack the problems of today and design the ships of tomorrow." 
THE NAVAL SEA CADET CORPS NEEDS LEADERSHIP 
The Naval Sea Cadet Corps is a mationwide youth program sponsored by the Navy League of 
the United States and supported by the Department of the Navy. The objectives of the NSCC 
are: 
a. To develop in young men an interest and skill in seamanship and sea going disciplines; 
b. To instill in Cadets an appreciation for our Navy's history, customs, traditions and 
the significance of a modern Navy on the Department of Defense team; 
c. To build in every cadet a sense of patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and confidence; 
those qualities which will mold good character and citizenship. 
d. To raise the prestige of a military career and increase the advancement potential (~ 
of Cadets who may later elect to serve with the Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard. 
The Naval Sea Cadet Corps depends upon volunteers from among active duty and retired 
personnel for leadership. Currently positions are open with the Monterey County Division 
of the Naval Sea Cadet Corps for officers who like to work with youths. In addition, the 
unit is presently trying to expand its program to include young ladies who might be inclined 
in a service career, but needs a woman volunteer who would work with the distaff side. 
If you are interest in becoming a volunteer in this worthwhile program, or are 
interested in more information for yourself or your son or daughter contact LCDR Tom 
Forbes, SMC 2867 or LCDR Bob Finley SMC 1590. 
